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M. Harmtmann, J. Liptow, M. Willaschek (eds.), Die Gegenwart des Pragmatismus, 
Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2013, 364 p.
The book collects the papers presented at a conference held at Goethe University 
Frankfurt in 2007, which celebrated the 100 year anniversary of the publication 
of James’ Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. It contains 
contributions from leading scholars, who discuss the relevance of pragmatism for 
addressing current problems in epistemology, the philosophy of language, the 
philosophy of mind, political philosophy, the philosophy of religion etc. It also contains 
papers that consider pragmatism in its relationship with other philosophical traditions, 
such as continental and analytic philosophy. The book thus presents a stimulating 
examination of the various fields in which a pragmatist approach to philosophy can be 
significant for philosophy today.
The collection is composed of 13  articles, preceded by an introduction, and it is 
divided in three parts. The first part, which contains articles by Philip Kitcher, Cheryl 
Misak, Barbara Merker, and Marcus Willaschek, considers pragmatism from the 
point of view of the original methods it introduced in philosophy. The second part, 
with articles written by Christopher Hookway, Martin Seel, Jasper Liptow, Bjørn 
T. Ramberg, and Jennifer Welchman, takes into consideration the contribution of 
pragmatism to discussions in theoretical philosophy, including logic, epistemology, 
the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. In the last part, Elizabeth 
Anderson, Martin Hartmann, Susan Haack, and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann address 
issues having to do with practical philosophy and, in particular, with the theory of 
democracy, legal philosophy and the philosophy of religion. Instead of commenting 
the articles following the order in which they are presented in the book, I will identify 
some themes that have major relevance in the collection and discuss first the Chapters 
that are directly connected with these themes. I will then comment on those papers 
that are equally significant, but do not have strong ties with other articles in the book.
The first theme I want to discuss concerns the evaluation of the place of 
James’ pragmatic method within the pragmatist tradition, just as its relevance for 
contemporary philosophy. In this respect, it is really interesting to examine together 
Philip Kitcher’s and Cheryl Misak’s contributions, insofar as they propose very 
different views on James’ pragmatism. In her article “Hundert Jahre Pragmatismus”, 
Misak presents what is a quite common description of the tradition of pragmatism, 
where two streams are identified: one rooted in Charles S. Peirce’s work, and one in 
William James’. The article focuses on how pragmatists have accounted for the way 
in which we fix standards of objectivity and attribute truth to our beliefs. She argues 
that, in this respect, Peirce offers us a convincing account of truth and objectivity, one 
that can be relevant for a new “renaissance” of pragmatism along lines different from 
those suggested by Rorty. Even if she recognizes some commonalities in the views 
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on objectivity proposed by Peirce, James and Dewey (73-4), she follows Rorty’s own 
reconstruction of pragmatism in attributing to James the germs of an approach to 
philosophy that does not see truth as a relevant concept in order to account for our 
practices (75-6). In her reading, Peirce offered us a better alternative to this approach, 
an alternative that was further developed in the work of the logical empiricist, of 
C. I.  Lewis, and of Quine. This alternative does not throw away the concept of truth 
altogether, but it reinterprets it in the context of our historically determined inquiries 
as something that is in our reach, but that we cannot ever be sure to have achieved 
(73).
A quite different view on James’ account of truth is presented by Philip Kitcher, 
who, in his article “Der andere Weg”, reads James’ pragmatism not as foreshadowing 
a degradation of the concept of truth, but as presenting an account of truth that shows 
its pragmatic meaning in the context of our lives. Kitcher argues that it would be 
wrong to understand James’ (and Dewey’s) pragmatism as proposing an alternative 
theory on the same problems which have been the central concern of philosophy for 
centuries (38). In this respect, among the purposes of James’ pragmatism there is not 
the introduction of an alternative philosophical theory of truth which would reject 
the correspondence theory (44, 46). Rather, James wants to articulate our common 
sense understanding of truth as correspondence and to show how this correspondence 
should be understood in the context of our practices (46  ff.). James rejects the idea 
that interpreting truth as correspondence requires us to maintain that there is only one 
possible correct description of reality. By contrast, there are various ways of describing 
the same reality, which, while different with respect to the particular purposes and 
aims for which they are developed, are nonetheless corresponding with the reality 
they designate, insofar as they allow the establishment and the iteration of a praxis 
that puts us in contact with it (51). This pragmatic approach to the clarification of what 
correspondence means gives us also relevant insight on how to reconsider the role 
of philosophy within our society. In this respect, both James and Dewey understood 
philosophy as a discipline that should address problems that are of central interest for 
humanity in a particular historical moment. Philosophy should not be the professional 
undertaking of people considering some problems they inherited from their tradition. 
Rather, philosophy should be able to identify and answer those questions that are 
significant for the self-understanding of human beings in a particular historical 
moment (56  ff.). 
A defense of James’ pragmatism against superficial readings is also provided 
by Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, who, in his article “Was ist religiöse Erfahrung? 
Überlegungen im Anschluss an William James”, argues that James’ pragmatism should 
not be seen as a form of instrumentalism. Eventually, this becomes clear in James’s 
writings on religion, where religious and mystic experiences are not the means to the 
realization of some purposes, but are meaningful experiences that have actual effects 
on our self-understanding as subjects (354  ff.).
A second theme that I want to discuss is the relationship between pragmatism 
and naturalism. This topic is directly considered by two articles in the second part 
of the book, written respectively by Bjørn Ramberg and Jennifer Welchman. In his 
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paper “Sprache, Geist und Naturalismus in der analytischen Philosophie”, Ramberg 
argues that a pragmatist standpoint on the mind-body problem can give us the 
possibility to develop a non-reductionist naturalistic philosophy, one which does not 
either try to reduce the mental to the physical or to propose an unbridgeable dualism 
(194). Ramberg develops this pragmatist standpoint along the lines of what he calls 
the “interpretativsit strategy” (198  ff.). Following the methodology of Davidson’s 
radical interpretation, he addresses mental phenomena taking the standpoint of 
an ideal interpreter who should rationalize the behavior of a human agent without 
having any previous knowledge of the agent’s intentions, beliefs, etc. From this 
perspective, a psychological “vocabulary” which attributes mental states like beliefs, 
doubts, intentions, etc. to this agent is inescapable in order to rationally explain the 
agent’s behavior (206  ff.). The need of this vocabulary should not be seen as causing 
unsolvable contradictions for the proponent of a naturalist conception of the world, 
insofar as a naturalist position, at least from a pragmatist standpoint, does not require 
the individuation of a fundamental ontology (217  ff.). Ramberg’s reflections are thus 
relevant for the development of a pragmatist naturalism that interacts with central 
figures in the analytic tradition, like Davidson. In this context, it would be interesting 
to address how this kind of non-reductionist naturalism relates to other forms of 
naturalism endorsed by the classical pragmatists.
The task of comparing contemporary accounts of naturalism to proposals advanced 
by the classical pragmatists is taken up by Jennifer Welchman in her article “Zwei Arten 
von Naturalismus, zweiter Natur und kommunikativen Praktiken. Eine pragmatische 
Antwort auf McDowell”. Welchman argues that McDowell and Dewey endorse a 
similar viewpoint when they criticize the reductionist view of nature that identifies 
the latter with the realm of natural laws. Accordingly, Dewey agrees with McDowell 
when he argues against the complete reduction of nature to the disenchanted nature of 
the natural sciences (225). Moreover, both use the idea of a “second nature” in order 
to make room for values and reasons in our conception of nature (227). However, 
this basic agreement notwithstanding, McDowell rejects a fundamental assumption 
of Dewey’s position, that is, the continuity between first and second nature (229  ff., 
250-1), between natural and biological laws on the one hand, and reasons and values 
on the other. This strong separation between first and second nature, between the 
space of nature and the space of reasons, is evident in McDowell’s account of non-
human animals, which for him are constrained in the realm of natural laws (231  ff.). 
For McDowell there is so an absolute gap between human and non-human life, where 
only humans have access to a second nature. Welchman argues convincingly that, 
from the fact that we must see two models of explanation (as the space of nature 
and the space of reasons are) as being discontinuous, we cannot infer that the reality 
they are used to describe is equally discontinuous (234). She supports her thesis with 
various examples from experiments on intelligent animals and she concludes that a 
form of second nature can be attributed to some of them (233-49). 
The second part of the book contains also two articles discussing Robert 
Brandom’s work. In this respect, Martin Seel’s Chapter “Perspektivität und 
Objektivität. Überlegungen mit Rücksicht auf Robert Brandom” maintains that 
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Brandom’s pragmatism, especially as it is presented in Making it Explicit, shows 
how perspectivity and objectivity are not two concepts in opposition (155  ff.). After 
praising Brandom’s attempt of finding a balance between these two concepts, Seel 
also advances some critical points (162-3), as for example the observation that the 
fact that we must see our world as conceptually structured does not imply that it is 
so (a thesis that Brandom seems to defend). Seel accordingly describes a pragmatist 
as a moderate realist, who does not confuse the independence of the world from our 
thinking with the dependence of our concepts of the world on our thinking (154).
A more critical stance against Brandom’s postion is taken by Jasper Liptow, in 
his article “Pragmatische Bedeutungstheorien und das Prinzip der Autonomie der 
Bedeutung”. Liptow claims that Davidson’s principle of the autonomy of meaning 
makes evident that Brandom’s theory of meaning is inadequate. A pragmatist theory 
of meaning, at least according to Brandom’s account, argues that the meaning of a 
linguistic expression should be clarified by means of the pragmatic significance of 
the sentences that contain this expression (171). According to Liptow, this theory of 
meaning does not allow us to account for those cases in which propositions with the 
same propositional content have different pragmatic significance with respect to the 
different modes (declarative, imperative, interrogative, etc.) in which the proposition 
is asserted (173-80). This fact is grasped by Davidson’s principle of the autonomy 
of meaning, which maintains that there cannot be any constitutive relationship 
between the syntactic-semantic elements of propositions and their illocutionary 
power, which is given in their complete expression (187). Liptow’s criticisms are 
certainly compelling and deserve close attention, which here I cannot provide. One 
minor critical observation that could be made is the following: Liptow focuses on 
Brandom’s pragmatist approach to the philosophy of language in order to reject the 
pragmatist theory of meaning altogether. However, Brandom’s account of meaning 
is not the only one that can be called pragmatist, and there are other pragmatists that 
would deserve a closer consideration, like for example Charles S. Peirce.
Another theme that has a central significance in the collection is the theory of 
democracy. In the third part of the book, two articles by Elizabeth Anderson and 
Martin Hartmann address this topic from very different perspectives. In her article 
“Die Epistemologie der Demokratie”, Anderson maintains that Dewey’s model of 
democracy is the best one to account for the epistemic capacity of democratic societies 
to solve those problems, whose solution depends on the circulation of information 
in a social environment (255). Dewey’s model is superior to concurrent ones, like 
Condorcet’s jury theorem, or the Diversity-Trumps-Ability (DTA) theorem, because 
it (a) points out the epistemic capacities of the constitutive features of democratic 
societies; (b) manifests the epistemic strengths and weaknesses of these institutions; 
and (c) presents the guidelines for the improvement of their epistemic capacities 
(259). Only Dewey’s model of democracy offers us a paradigm that is capable of 
accomplishing the first task (265 ff.). Moreover, Dewey’s model is the only one that 
captures the epistemic relevance of dissent. It does that by highlighting the need of an 
institutionalization of dissent in a “loyal opposition” (271).
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A quite different problem is addressed by Martin Hartmann, who, in his paper 
“Kann und sollte Demokratie epistemisch gerechtfertigt werden?” discusses Dewey 
in the context of a critique of epistemic justifications of democracy. Epistemic 
Justifications of democracy try to justify the use of democratic procedures on the basis 
of their capacity to produce a correct choice in various fields. Dewey is normally seen 
as a reference figure for this approach. Hartmann analyses three models of epistemic 
justification of democracy: Putnam’s (284-5), Misak’s (286-8), and Honneth’s (288-
90) and he presents various reasons to reject each one of them (290-304). After 
advancing these criticisms, Hartmann argues that it is possible to find in Dewey a 
non-epistemic perspective on the justification of democratic procedures (304), one 
that offers a normative and non-instrumental defense of democracy (306).
These are the themes that obtain major consideration in the book and for this reason 
I have focused my review on them. However, even though they do not touch topics 
that are discussed by other articles, the papers of Barbara Merker, Marcus Willaschek, 
Christopher Hookway and Susan Haack deserve to be mentioned, because they propose 
relevant and original ideas. In particular, Willaschek’s article “Bedingtes Vertrauen. 
Auf dem Weg zu einer pragmatischen Transformation der Metaphysik” advances an 
interesting reading of Kant’s postulates, which, according to him, can offer the basis 
for a new pragmatic approach to metaphysics, one that justifies particular metaphysical 
sentences for their being implied in our praxis (116-7). This form of metaphysics is 
in accordance with a pragmatist account of rationality, which, in order to consider a 
belief justified, does not require us to answer to all the possible “why-questions” that 
can be asked in connection to that belief. The latter approach to justification would 
be what Willaschek calls the traditional account of rationality (107  ff.). By contrast, 
from a pragmatist perspective on justification, we are only required to answer the 
actual “why-questions” that are relevant in a particular context (110  ff.). Merker’s 
article “Phänomenologie und Pragmatismus” defends the quite original thesis that 
Husserl’s phenomenology contains pragmatic themes, especially in connection to his 
consideration of the concept of lifeworld (Lebenswelt) (92  ff.). In his paper “Peirce, 
Logik und Psychologismus”, Hookway analyzes an account of logic, which is certainly 
original within the pragmatist tradition, that is, Peirce’s anti-psychologic approach to 
logic (123  ff.). Last but not least, Haack’s article “Das pluralistische Universum des 
Rechts. Hin zu einem neoklassischen Rechtspragmatismus” shows how a pragmatist 
approach can be relevant for the philosophy of law. Haack develops her argument 
focusing on the work of Oliver Wendell Holmes (311  ff.), a Supreme Court judge who 
had strong connections with William James and Charles Peirce (he was a member of 
the “metaphysical club”).
This collection of essays surely presents a wide-ranging exposition of the various 
fields in which a pragmatist approach can be relevant and worth considering for 
philosophy today. Moreover, it shows how pragmatism can offer a bridge between very 
different philosophical traditions. The attention given to classical and contemporary 
figures in the pragmatist movement is well balanced and appropriately exemplifies the 
richness of this approach to philosophy.
GabRiele GaVa m. haRmtmann, J. liPtow, m. willaschek, die GeGenwaRt des PRaGmatismus
